Thursday, 13 October 2011

How can IEM respond to an environmental disaster?

I had hoped to incorporate a more international flavour in today’s post (thanks to Lara for that inspiration), but I just can’t get past the unfolding environmental disaster in the Bay of Plenty that has been dominating the news for the past week.


The beginning of the oil leak (it has increased substantially in the subsequent bad weather)


Showing the crack in the ship's hull
 (Wednesday 12 October)

In case you’re not aware of the crisis, it began when the 47,000 tonne, 236m cargo ship “Rena” ran aground on the Astrolabe reef in the early hours of October 5th. Quite how this happened, and who is responsible, is not yet clear, and it is even less clear how long the oil leaking from the ship will continue. As I finish this post, the ship has not yet broken in two, although it has lost about 70 containers and is predicted to break up in today’s heavy seas.


A dead yellow-eyed penguin

Meanwhile, hundreds of tonnes of thick, toxic fuel oil* has leaked from the ships ruptured fuel tanks, with an estimated 1700 tonnes still onboard. To date, dozens of seabirds and an unknown number of fish and other sea life has succumbed to the oil sludge, that is now covering Mount Maunganui, Maketu and Papamoa beaches.



Papamoa Beach

So how could an IEM approach be used to prevent this crisis happening? Well, let’s start with some problem definition.  There are a number of ways to look at the issue:

1) Failings by Maritime New Zealand to prevent the ship leaving Bluff on 28 September, where their inspections allegedly showed inaccurate navigation charts. Problem: insufficient authority, expertise or resources for Maritime NZ.

2) The ship’s crew are alleged to have been celebrating the Captain’s 44th birthday on the night the ship ran aground. Problem: culture of drinking on large cargo ships.

3) The ship’s operator is Costamare Inc, parent company of the ship’s owner, Daina Shipping Co., but the ship has been chartered by the Mediterranean Shipping Company. Problem: difficult to find out who is responsible for the ship.

4) The Government response to both the stranding and the subsequent oil leakage was perceived by many to be too slow, with authorities ill-equipped to deal with a disaster of this magnitude. Problem: under resourcing of maritime disaster response units, lack of co-ordination and leadership between authorities.

The list could go on and on. The point being that, in a situation such as this, one that New Zealand has never had to deal with, the definition of the problem may go a long way to ensure that such a disaster never happens again, or at least not to the same degree as the Rena stranding.



This appeared last week on a shipping
crate at Papamoa

Another aspect of IEM worth considering is how community based environmental management (CBEM) could help with the cleanup of the beaches. Many locals are becoming increasingly angry with authorities for the delay in co-ordinating a cleanup response, but more importantly, for keeping locals away from the beaches, and preventing their involvement in the cleanup efforts. Whilst there are issues surrounding the toxicity of the oil, as well as the best methods for removing it from the beaches so as not to make the environmental impact worse, there seems to have been very little in the way of collaboration between authorities and locals. This seems absurd when you consider the size of the job, as well as the number of willing helpers. Gaining some social capital at the outset could go a long way in the Government’s favour if the situation worsens (as it is likely to do). Only today am I seeing messages on the NZ Herald website, requesting volunteers to help. Could this not have been done sooner? Would the Government have gained some much needed brownie points? And would the environmental effects of the oil have been mitigated by a quicker response?


Maritime NZ Salvage Unit Manager Bruce Anderson,
Environment Minister Nick Smith, Transport Minister
Steven Joyce and National On Scene Commander
Nick Quinn at the press conference at Tauranga
Boys’ College on Tuesday afternoon.

This discussion leads me to consider how better institutional integration might have either prevented this disaster, or at least reduced the impact it is now having on the Bay of Plenty environment, by allowing a quicker response to the ship’s stranding last week. It seems now that the oil leak and likely disintegration of the vessel was inevitable. Such is the value of hindsight. But did the authorities really believe this would happen last week? At the time, the weather was fine, so no attempt was made to remove the containers from the ship (arguably due to lack of proper equipment) or to empty the fuel tanks of oil (also due to equipment, although the barge had only to come from Auckland). Lack of public information on how to safely clean up the beaches, and officials telling people to stay away, has led to public hostility against those in charge. Could better co-ordination between Maritime New Zealand, the Government Ministries (Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Transport) and conservation groups have helped with the salvage and oil cleanup efforts, if not with public perception?  It also might have helped if the proper equipment was closer to hand – should New Zealand have its own floating crane to remove containers in future? This would not seem excessive in a country so reliant on cargo ships to move freight. The ship itself was not an oil tanker (perish the thought!) and there are thousands of cargo vessels navigating our harbours every year.

Whilst I cannot begin to solve all the questions raised in this post, I think it is appropriate that an IEM approach be considered as a way forward from this situation. It might not have all the answers, and the series of circumstance giving rise to the disaster may never happen again, but there are certainly aspects of IEM that can be drawn on to help manage the recovery, and possibly prevent future catastrophes.

Fuel oil

 
*Fuel oil used aboard ships is known as “bunker fuel”, a name derived from the storage of coal in bunkers for when ships were powered by steam. The only things more dense than bunker fuel are carbon black feedstock and bituminous residue which is used for paving roads (asphalt) and sealing roofs (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_oil#Bunker_fuel)

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